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i THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~--------------------------------------

.OF UTAH,
~~intiff

and Respondent,

Case No. 12467

vs.
U GENE

CARTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

--------------------------------------BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

~--------------------------------------

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from his conviction of second degree
ary in violation of 76-9-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), upon
~

jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court,

Utah

y, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LCMER COURT
Appellant was charged by information with the crime of
d degree burglary; he was arraigned and entered a plea
t

guilty on January 29, 1971.

~urice

Trial by jury before the

Harding was held on February 9, 1971, which re-

d in a verdict of "guilty. 11

Appellant was remanded to

ustody of the Utah County Sheriff to be held in the
~unty Jail pending sentencing.

On February 19, 1971,

~e was imposed confining Appellant in the Utah State

!l!or the indeterminate term provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that his conviction should be set a-

or, that in the alternative, the conviction should be
~ed

and a new trial granted.
STATEMENT OF FAcrs

In December of 1970 the home of Francis Lundell in
Utah, was burglarized (T.7-8).

~n,
~d,

The police re-

and at trial Mr. Lundell identified, a shotgun,

1rifle, watch and wallet as items missing from his home
Thereafter Appellant and others were charged with

ill).

1rime.
~he

State first called Ruth Bethers, who had known

:lant for eight years; she testified that Appellant and

wo brothers, Danny and Larry Carter, were frequently
her, and that Appellant and Danny Carter were frequenther home (T 22).
0

Ms. · Bethers did not see any of the

n items in Appellant's possession (T.22), and although
tedly asked by the prosection about conversations which
ight have overheard (T.14, T.16, T.17, and T.20), she
Dt testify that she had heard Appellant make any rethat would implicate him in the burglary (T.22).
Ms. Bethers testified that on December 21st Appellant

nher home at around noon with Ike McDonald and Danny
t, and that Larry Carter (her fiancee) and Bill Bethers,

.tently her ex-husband) were also present (T.14) •

At

time she saw two wallets in the possession of Ike Mc(T. 15 (.

~d.

When asked i f she had overheard any con-

ltion, she answered:

"The only thing I can

remember

ldy saying was Ike said he couldn 1 t help i t because the
1oydied;" and she "heard Larry keep telling them

they

1razy" (T. 15).
:Appellant, Danny Carter, and Ike McDonald returned to
~~

at about 4:00 P.M. that afternoon, and again

at

15:45 P.M., at which time Larry Carter told her

"he

It want to go with them, but he had to talk them

out

(T.17).

111
I

She did not testify who "them" included,

they were going, nor what "it" was that he was going

Ilk "them" out of.

But more important, it is evident

"it" was not the burglary because Ms. Bethers had al1

testified that she had seen at least one wallet taken

1e

burglary in the possession of Ilie McDonald (T. 15).

Appellant, Danny Carter, Ike McDonald and, apparently,
'Carter then left, but returned again about 6:30 p.m.
1
),

1
•

Larry Carter brought the Craig Rifle into the
Appellant and his other companions then left again,

.arry Carter kept the rifle at "home" with him

that

: (T .17 -18) •

On December 22nd Appellant again returned to Bether's
With Danny carter, Ike McDonald, Oliver Jenkins and

-3-

rt Carter; one Archie Thompson was also present.

Larry

apparently turned the Craig Rifle over to Archie

1

1son (T.18-19).
~December 24th Appellant was again in Bether 1 s home

Danny and Albert Carter.

At that time Danny was "want-

sell the watch to (Larry Carter), but I didn 1 t hear

iO

1ing from (Appellant) about it"(T. 19-20).
Subsequently Ms. Bethers turned the Craig rifle and
ihotgun which she had gotten from Archie Thompson 1 s
over to the police.
~e

next witness called by the State was Bill Bethers

~d

the following to contribute (direct examination of

Bethers at T. 22-24):

Q. Calling your attention to the 20th day of.
December of 1970 • • • did you have occasion to
be present in Ruth Bether's (sic) home?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

Did you have occasion to see the defendant?

Q.

You didn 1 t see Joe?

A.

No.

Unh-unh.

l!r, Bethers then testified that he saw Appellant on

1st at around noon at Ms. Bethers, Ik e McDonald and
~rter also being present; at that time he saw Ike

Bld With the wallet and a business card with the name

-4-

Q. Do you remember any statements by either
Ike McDonald or Joe or Danny in your presence,
in the presence of Joe on that day?
A. Unh-unh. I was just there a few minutes
that day.
An additional witness for the State was William Albert
~'

who despite nominal identity is not a blood rela-

to Appellant.
~een

He testified that on December 22nd he

"riding around" in Danny Carter 1 s car with Danny

'

~rand

Appellant; the witness was "pretty sure there

Jnother one," but couldn 1 t remember who the other one
(T,25-26).

On this occasion Danny Carter gave Albert

Ir the stolen watch to "hawk" (T.25).

This witness 1 s

lmony, like that of Bill Bethers 1 , was vague and con-

ag, as is illustrated by the following excerpt from
It

examination at T. 26-27:

Q. While riding around, did you have a conversation with them concerning anything that
they had done on the previous day?
A. Well, they had said something, but they
didn 1 t say too much. They just told me that
thei had broke into a house (emphasis added).
Mr. Sumsion: Now, I object.
to know who said what?

I would like

Q. (By Mr. Maxfield): As you were riding
around, who, specifically, stated to you that
they had broken into a house, do you remember?
Mr. Sumsion:
leading.

Now, wait a minute.

This is

The Court:

He may answer.

The Witness: Well, I can't recall who said
I wouldn't say for certain who said
it. (emphasis added).
it.

...

Q. Did they tell you anything that they
got from the home?
A.

Well, they said a couple of things.

Q.

What were the things that they said?

A.

Well, one was

Mr. Sumsion: --- If the Court please, I
would like to renew my objection. He is
speaking in general terms of "they" and I
think we are entitled to know who said what.
The Court: If he can say which one said
what, why, please do so.
The Witness: I really can't say, because
we were all talking (emphasis added).
The Court:

You may answer anyway.

ll~rt Carter further testified that on this occasion
11

r

went to the home that had been broken into to look

lanny Carter's driver 1 s license (T.28), but when asked

!knew if Appellant had gone into the house, he could
say:

"~n't

know.

I won't say anything on that, be-

ll..£.an 1 t remember (emphasis added) (T. 31)."
On cross-examination Albert Carter only emphasized the
that he had nothing to add to the State 1 s case except
Usion and prejudicial implication (at T. 34-37):

-6-

~· N~w, whi~e you were testifying you kept
saying. They did this" and "They did that;" and
you said you can 1 t say definitely who said what?
A. Well, when everybody is talking all at
once you can't remember.

Q. You can't say which one of them said what?
A.

No.

Q. And they took you back to a house down in
the southern end of the county to look for a
driver's license?
A.

Yes.

...

Q. Now, Joe (Appellant) was with you on this
occasion?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did he do when you came to the home?

A. Well, one of them stayed in the car.
I won 1 t say which one.

Q.

Now,

Was it Joe?. Do you think it was Joe?

A. I can 1 t remember which one stayed in the
car. I stayed there (emphasis added).

Q. Now, while you were riding around ·on this
day in the car, did you ever hear Joe say that he
had gone down and burglarized this place, or anything that would lead you to believe that he had?
Is there anything specific that Joe said?
A. I can't remember him saying anything (emphasis added).

• • •

Q. Did anyone else that was with you say anything about Joe having been with them down there
at that place on previous occasions?

A. Actually, they didn't tell me who all
was there.

Q.

Did they say that Joe was there?

A.

No, they didn't.

...

Qo So he may have been riding with his
brothers just like you were on that day?

A.

Yeso (T.34-37).

The State's last witness was Mack Holley, Utah County

Sheriff, whose testimony conunenced with a recitation

~y

lS attempt

to warn Appellant of his constitutional

ts and continued with a recitation of statements made
~nny

Carter and "admissions" or statements allegedly

by Appellant.
t

Since the testimony of this witness

is

with extensively in Point V. at page 22 , infra, it
oot be set forth in detail here.
no

Suffice it to say

objection was made to any of the testimony of Depu-

Dlley and that Appellant contends that the bulk of his

lmony was inadmissable and should have been e~cluded.

After the noon recess counsel stipulated that if Sher~apple
~o

were called he would testify that he received

guns from Ruth Bethers and turned them over to Depu-

)lley, and that if Dean Van Wagenen were called he would

lfy that he loaned the $15.00 on the watch as testified

-8-

~Albert Carter, that the watch was turned over to Steve

~of the sheriff's department and he turned it over to
~yHolley; the Court then instructed the jury to consid~e

stipulations to be true (T. 48-49).

The Court then denied Appellant 1 s Motion to Dismiss on

ground that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain
necessary allegations to make out a charge of burglary,
ih motion was submitted without argument (T. 50).

The only evidence or testimony presented by Appellant 1 s
llcounsel was the testimony of Appellant's wife, Paddie

ler, whose versions of the "admissions" made by Appellant

'T. 51-55) differed in significant detail from the testiI

of Deputy Holley.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.

The evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to
1blish guilt beyond a reasonable ~doubt; and the-tri·al

:t therefore erred in denying Appellant's motion to

ti.ss.
There was ample evidence to show that a burglary had
lcommi.tted

'

and there was evidence tending to indicate

t others had participated in the burglary, i.e., posses-

-9-

~of recently stolen property.
~l~y,

However, apart from Depu-

not one witness offered any direct evidence of

,11ant 1 s guilt, and it strains credulity to argue that the
lence of a circumstantial nature offered by these other
1esses met the requisite burden or even approached it.
Hs. Bethers 1 testimony at best established that Appel: was in the company of others who had possession of re;ly stolen property shortly after the time the burglary

: have been corrnnitted; she certainly did not -- indeed
~not

-- testify that Appellant had any stolen property

as possession nor that she heard him make any incriming remarks.

It is clear that proof of mere association

others who are in possession of recently stolen properennot of itself sustain a conviction of anything, let
e burglary; the only permissable inference under Utah
is that possession by a defendant is pr~ma facie evidence

Uilt of larceny, not burglary.
3),

76-38-1, Utah Code Anno.

Even if it could be inferred from the record

that

llant had possession of recently stolen property, which
Bnnot; and even if there were any authority that such
ession were a sufficient basis upon which to infer guilt
~g~ry, which there isn't; such proof of possession

d require corroboration by other competent, admissable

ence which of itself tends to establish guilt.

State v.

~' 23 Utah 2d 347 (1970).

The only evidence in

the

prd which could conceivably tend to establish guilt inde~antly is the highly ambiguous statements of Appellant
~he "was part of it"

•r inadmissabi li ty
nt v.,

(discussed infra, pagel4-l~.

The

of these statements, demonstrated at

page 22, infra, leaves the record entirely devoid

1ny independant corroboration of guilt of grand larceny,
alone burglary, as is required by Smelser, id •.
The testimony of Bill Bethers was so insignificant and
llevant that one wonders why he was called at all unless
Jas to add to the confusion and vague implication which
~eated Appellant's trial.

And the testimony of Wm. Albert Carter, obviously in-

led by the State to imply that Appellant had participated
lhe burglary, at most implied only that he might have
~cipated; it established only that he had subsequently

Ito the burglarized home and probably remained in the
That fact certainly cannot be equated with guilt be! a reasonable doubt.

This witness's entire testimony

given in terms of "they" and "I can 1 t remember?"

He

li.fically stated that he did not know if Appellant had
1

into the house, and could not remember Appellant having

I anything at all, let alone anything that would indicate

: Appellant had participated in the burglary•
-ll-

~e State's theory was obviously that if the evidence
~t show Appellant's direct participation in the burglary,

lact of going to the Lundell home subsequent to the bur~~de

him a principal; hence the jury instruction (No.

It R, 17):

All persons concerned in the connnission of
the crime who either directly and actively
committed the act constituting the offense,
or who knowingly and with criminal intent, aid
and abet in its commission or, whether present
or not, who advised and encourage its commission, are regarded by the law as principals in
the crime thus committed and are equally guilty thereof.,
Appellant does not contend that this is an erroneous in~tion
~er,

on the law of principals.

Appellant does assert,

that giving the instruction was an error since

lis no evidence tending to indicate that Appellant knowF and with criminal intent aided and abetted in the com-

lon of the burglary nor advised or encouraged its comm.is-

Trial counsel should have taken an exception to this
ruction.
Bethers 1 testimony, taken at its strongest, shows only
Appellant went to the scene of the crime with his broth~the burglary had been committed.

The record is de-

of any proof that Appellant was present when the burg~as planned or committed.

At most, the State proved

that Appellant became aware of the burglary after it

been conuni tted.

The State could not even prove that Ap ..

i,ant conuni tted any act which enabled his brothers to con-

1the crime.
The State will undoubtedly contend, however, that the
tence of Mack Holley was sufficient to warrant the jury
ling Appellant guilty of the charge of burglary beyond a
1onable doubt, pointing to the following testimony:
And Danny Carter said, "Joe, you just as
well tell him the truth, because he knows about it. He has been able to get some of the
items that were taken."
And at this point Joe said, "Okay. Okay.
I was a part of it. I was a part of the
burglaryo" (T. 41).
Notwithstanding the fact that the jury should have been
iructed upon the necessity of corroborating evidence to
ort the portion of Holley 1 s testimony concerning statesmade by a party who was acknowledgedly present at the
bry (it does not appear from the record that such an in-

ction was requested or refused), such testimony does re-

e corroboration. 77-31-18, Utah Code Anno.(1953).

The

that the testimony came in by way of hearsay only demontes the necessity for strict adherence to the corroborarequirement.

Appellant submits that the record is en-

ly devoid of any such corroboration.

It is certainly not

e found in the testimony of Ms. Bethers, nor Bill Bethers,
the most the testimony of Wm. Albert Carter establishes
-13-

that Appellant knew about the crime after the fact,
~e

a

with which he was not charged.
kither can the requisite corroboration be found in the

tements allegedly made by Appellant as testified to by De-

rHolley

(supra, page 13); apart from questions of admis-

llity, it is clear that:

(t)he corroborating evidence must connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense, and be consistent with his guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence. It must do
more than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant and it must do all of these things
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice. State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495,
123 P.2d 539, 541 (1953).
Deputy Holley 1 s testimony can be no stronger than its
Insistent weakness.
1675(1971).

Ross v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 342, 481

On cross-examination Holley 1 s testimony as

~at was said by Danny Carter was practically identical

h testimony on direct.

Regarding the "admission" al-

dly made by Appellant, however, on direct examination

ty testified (at T. 41) that Appellant said: "Okay,
• I was par t o f ;t
.....

I was a part of the burglary."

~ss~xamination, however, he testified that the state-

IVas only: "Okay, okay.

I was a part of it" (T. 44).

efore, because of the inconsistency, the statement made
PPellant must be taken to have been: "I was a part of
This statement is not consistent with guilt and incon-14-

~nt with innocence; State v. Vigil, supra; because it is
~fy consistent that Appellant meant only that he had

\to the Lundell place with his brother Danny to look for
~'s

license.

See the testimony of Wm. Albert Carter

'rith at pages 11-12, supra.
1Further, Appellant had earlier told Deputy Holley that

Id not been involved in the burglary and that he did not
to answer any more questions (T.40).
~ 11

"Just a couple of

later, although Holley would not characterize the same

Jestions, T. 43, Holley arranged a confrontation between
~lant

and his brothers which, according to the testimony

mey, resulted in the statement by Appellant: "I was a
of it."

And Paddie Carter's testimony was that Holley

1aid: "Alright, now, let's have the truth out of you,
1

that Joe replied: "I am telling the truth. I didn't do

ling."

And that this went back and forth between the

If them, "What evidence?" "We have got it, 11 about three
I,

(T, 53).

Not only was Appellant's statement consis-

With innocence (i.e., he was a part of "it" in that he
lone to the scene with Danny to look for the license),
:he foregoing establishes that Appellant, having told
1Y that

he didn 1 t want to answer any more questions,

the remark merely because he was irritated by the fact
Rolley was obviously continuing to question him and de-
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~ 5 ~ply to get Holley off his back.

Especially is this

~ficant because of the three-fold defectiveness of the
~~'warning given by Holley, discussed at Point

-

v.,

page

,infra.

For these same reasons Holley's testimony regarding

Uant 1 s statements is not sufficient to sustain a verof guilty,

apart from the fact that the statements

Id not have been considered for any purpose at all.
,oint V., infra page 22 •
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
TESTIMONY OF WM. ALBERT CARTER OVER OBJECTION.
The major portion of Wm. Albert Carter 1 s testimony was
lrms of "they were riding around," "they said," "well, I
Lrecall who said it," "I wouldn't say for certain who
it," and "they were saying something about a house being
In into." (T. 24-32) (emphasis added).

Notwithstanding

iact that remarks like "they just told me that they
I

into a house," "they said a couple of things (that they

irom the home), 11

and "they said they took a dri 11, 11 were

~ ~ejudicial to Appellant, the trial court, while ap-

ltly thinking it would be nice or convenient if the witcould say which one said what, did not consider admiss.ty to be a relevant criterion.

Unless made by Appellant

statements were pure hearsay, and should have been ex-
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~ed.

The

lower court therefore committed prejudic:ial error in

~ing this witness, over Appellant 1 s objection (T. 27) to
Ufy in terms of a general category of persons which the

~ess was obviously not able to testify included Appellant.
~~tter fact is established by the following from cross~ination

at T. 34-37:

Q.

You can't say which one of them said what?

A.

No.

...

A. Well, one of them stayed in the car.
I won't say which one.

Now,

...

Q• • • • (D)id you ever hear Joe say that he
had gone down and burglarized this place, or anything that would lead you to believe that he had ••• ?
A.
POINT III.

I

can 1 t remember him saying anything.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE

JURY TO REGARD CERTAIN STIPULATIONS TO BE TRUE.

Just prior to resting the State requested a stipulation
arding certain testimony which would be given by Sheriff

PPle and a Dean Van Wagenen if they were called to testiAppellant 1 s trial counsel offered no objection and in
t did so stipulate.

The court then made the following

tement: "The jury will consider those stipulations to be
1e," (T.

49).

__Appeilant's counsel erred by stipulating because he

eclosed himself of an opportunity to cross-examine Dean

Wagenen regarding the person who "hawked" the watch and
ause a requested stipulation regarding what the testimony

Jan Wagenen would be (that he turned the watch over to
1e Payne of the Sheriff's Department who in turn delivered

watch to Deputy Holley) was obviously outside of Van Wagcounsel
~s competency. Defense/should have availed himself of
opportunity to cross-examine Van Wagenen in order to eslish that Appellant had had no part in hawking the watch.
But the real prejudice accruing to Appellant by this
~~arises

from the court's direction to the jury to con-

Ir the stipulations to be true.

It is axiomatic that the

1ction to the jury should have been that such would be
testimony of the witnesses, rather than that such testi-

'was true; and the court 1 s instruction (No.17 at R. 23):
1 are

the sole judges of the weight of the evidence, the

libility of the witnesses and the facts," while perhaps
!ctive to remedy inappropriate statements or conduct of
lsel, is not sufficient to overcome the implication and

!ct on the jury of the court 1 s earlier statement and con:, A direction such as the court gave, regardless of the

!ct to which directed, could only serve to buttress the
libility of all of the state 1 s witnesses and to divert
attention of the jury from its role as the sole finder
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ifact, the implication being that whatever evidence or tes,00y the

State offered the jury should consider to be true.

the least the court should have included an instruction
the effect that the jury should not consider nor be influ~ ~ the demeanor or apparent attitude of the judge.

If it be said that no objection was made to the court's
ection or that such an instruction was not requested, Ap-

lant asserts that apart from the fact that such an objec-

n should have been made and such an instruction requested
his trial counsel, the failures are not dispositive beseit is axiomatic that the mistake just should not have

n made by the 'trial judge in the first place.

1

For an ex-

b~ discussion of the impact of the judge on the jury

•Conner, The Demeanor of a Trial Judge: Its Effect on
llie, 76 Case and Commen.t 13.
POINT rv. FAILURE OF THE STATE TO REPORT THE CLOSING ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN APPEAL.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah proes that "in criminal prosecutions the accused shall
'e • • •

the right to appeal in all cases."

The gist of the nature of the right to an appeal is ap.late ~view of the proceedings in a lower court; Black's
1

Dictionary, Fourth Edition.

-19-

And this Court has always

~its

appellate function to be one of review in search

or; State v. Mclaughlin, 22 Utah 2d 321,324, 452 P. 2d

69).

Appellant therefore contends that what he is en-

to is a review by this Court of the entire proceedings
lower court and submits that this includes a review by
>urt of the closing arguments of counsel.

The correct-

[ this contention is established by 77-4l-3 Utah Code
(1953) which provides that the power of this Court ex:o any or all the proceedings.

Since this Court can

\because of errors committed by counsel during argu:tate v. Horr, 63 Utah 22, 221 P. 867 (1923), even if
:ted to (see U.S. v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (10th Cir.
rherein Chief Judge Lewis at page 204 held that a Fifth
mt

violation in final argument by comment on a defend-

1ilence is so prejudicial that the conviction must be
id despite failure to object); Appellant is entitled to

ds Court review the closing arguments.

LY·

See also,

California, 380 U.S. 609, wherein the Court held

:itutional California 1 s constitutional provision allow1

1

prosecutor to comment upon a defendant s failure to

1

any evidence.

!cause his right to a full review by this Court has
:ecluded by the failure of officers of the state to rete

closing arguments, Appellant is entitled to have his
-20-

reversed

ction ~~u:xbe or' at the very least' to be granted a
rial.

See, eog.' Schoonover So State, 3 CrLRptr 2186

:t.Crim.App. 5/15/68) where, in granting a new trial
1

the court reporter's failure to include closing argu-

in the transcript, the court stated that even approval

al counsel of an imperfect and incomplete Bill of Exins

"could never be said to constitute a waiver of this

mt defendant rs right to such appellate review on the
of this caseo

t cannot avail the State to claim that by failure to
t that the closing arguments be recorded Appellant has
this righto

Because there can be no waiver where the

ant does not know his rights, and because a waiver
e voluntary, any waiver of a constitutional right must

affirmatively from the record.
, Sec.219.

21 Am.Jur.2d, Crimin-

Courts indulge every reasonable presumption

t waiver of constitutional rights, should not presume
scense in the loss of fundamental rights, and cons ti tuPrivileges should not be suspended by mere inferences
~btful
1

304

presumption or indifferent facts.

u. s.

458, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58

s. Ct.1019

Johnson v.
(1938). In

Stant case the record is absolutely silent as to why
g arguments were not recorded, and this Court can only

responsibility for the failure with the State.

[naddition, this point is inseparably involved with
VI. ~ herein at page 34.
1ded

Not only is this Court

from reviewing the prosecuting attorney 1 s closing

!nt for prejudicial comments or conduct,

but appellate

1 has no way of ascertaining from the record what
counsel 1 s theory of the defense of the case was. The
appellate
y to ascertain this would enable~ counsel to demte to this Court the lack of any strategical or tactiasons for trial counsel to fail to object to testimony
Appellant contends was inadmissable and highly prejudiFurther, appellate counsel is precluded from reviewing
counsel 1 s comments to the jury during closing arguments.
ppellant submits that these preclusions are highly signt in their prejudice to him when, as here, it
iliat trial counsel

wa~

is con-

ineffective.

DINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING CER~IN TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY SHERIFF MACK HOLLEY.
• Violation of Fifth Amendment Rights.
le trial court erred in admitting or allowing admission
timony of Deputy Sheriff Mack Holley concerning inculstatements alledgedly made by Appellant because the
ents were made by' or' more realistically' obtained

~ppellant under circumstances which were violative of
fth Amendment privilege against self incrimination.

~randa v. Arizona, 384

u.s.

602 (1966) is by now such
~d

s.

436, 16 L.ed 2d 694, 86

fundamental law as to negate

for extensive quotation. At the risk of seeming pre-

wus the writer submits that Miranda establishes

that

(T)he prosecution may not use statements • • • stemming from custodial interrogation • • • unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards to secure the
privilege against self incrimination (at
page 444, emphasis added).
:hief Justice Warren, in enunciating the safeguards rel before custodial statements of defendants are admissi-

1stablished the following requisites:
• Prior to any questioning the person must be warned
.e has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
ake may be used as evidence against him, and that

he

right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
cinted, during questioning;
• If the individual is alone and indicates in any manat he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
estion him;
• An individual held for interrogation must be clearly
ed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer ~
~he

lawyer with him during the interrogation,

and

arning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation;
• Once these warnings have been given, if the individ!!!...s:tes in any manner that he wishes to remain silent,

~rrogation

must cease;

i. If the interrogation continues without the presence
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly
telligently waived his privilege;

, A valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the
e of the accused after the warnings are given or simply
he fact that a confession was in fact obtained; and,
, The record must affirmatively demonstrate these pro1 safeguards; a silent record does not give rise

to a

ption that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were
ted.
n addition to these mininum procedural safeguards,
!further established as fundamental law that the right
e counsel present during questioning is basic and indible to the Fifth Amendment privilege; that while a pre-

ogation request for a lawyer affirmatively secures the
to have one, failure to ask for a lawyer does not cona a waiver, since no effective waiver of the right to
l during interrogation can be recognized unless it

is

lcally madeafter the requisite warnings have been
and, that a once stated warning is not necessarily
lent among those who most require knowledge of their
• Further

'

Miranda also establishes that there is no
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.nction between direct confessions and admissions, and
any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked or

ed into a waiver will show that the defendant did

not

tarily waive his privilege.
rhis Court, of course, is no stranger to the principles
~'

and has basically incorporated them in Rule 63(6),

of Evidence, promulgated by this Court effective July 1,
Rule 63 deals with exceptions to the exclusionary rule
iing hearsay evidence, and subsection (6) thereof deals
~onfessions

and admissions as follows:

In a criminal proceeding against the accused,
a previous statement made by him relative to the
offense charged, if, and only if, the Judge
finds that the statement was made knowingly and
voluntarily by the accused and the circumstances
under which the statement was made were not violative of the constitutional rights of the
accused (emphasis added).
these Rules were not effective on the date of Appel! trial, it is evident that they are based on policies
ire .sound now and were sound on February 9, 1971.
tt

Ap-

further submits that Rule 63(6) is also based on the

nental principles of law, see Miranda v. Arizona, supra,
!hould have been applicable to his trial.

tt is therefore significant to note that in the case at
le trial judge made no finding that Appellant 1 s stateWhich were the subject of Deputy Holley's hearsay tesl

~ere made voluntarily and knowingly nor that the

umstances under which the statements were made were
ative of Appellant's constitutional rights.

not

Indeed, the

[judge could not make such a finding, because the cirJ~es surrounding Appellant's interrogation and the

me~s resulting therefrom were violative of his consti-

,nal rights.

Deputy Holley testified that the statements were made in
'tah County Jail (T. 39) after Appellant's arre.st (T. 42),
certainly amounts to custodial interrogation.

Holley

testified as follows regarding the "Miranda" warning he
Appellant (at T. 40):
I told him before he answered any questions
that he should know that he had the right to
remain silent; that he should know that anything that he said might be used against him
in court; that if he wanted me to discontinue
questioning at any time, that I would; that he
should know that he was entitled to an attorney to represent him; and that if he wasn't in
a position to employ an attorney that the court
would see that one was provided for his defense.
~eputy Holley's testimony then continued:

Q. After advising him of these rights, did you have
a conversation with him?

A. Yes sir. I asked him if he had been a part of
the burglary at Francis Lundell 1 s place?
Q.

And what did he answer?

A. He sa 1· d "No 11 that he hadn 1 t been and that he
'
didn't want ' to answer
any more questions at t h at
time (emphasis added).

Q. All right.

Did you have occasion to talk to him

later that day?
A. Yes. Just a couple of hours. I am not sure
about the time. I think the first time I talked
to him was around 1:00 and it was probably around
4:00 that I talked to him the second time
• • • •
(A)nd it was at this time that I got the jailer
to get Larry Carter and Danny Carter out of the
main tank.
I said, "Okay, Joe, I want you to tell these
guys that you didn 1 t do it."
So we got them all together and I said "Now
'
'
did you do it?" And Danny Carter said, "Joe,
you
just as well tell him the truth because he knows
about it. He has been able to get some of the
items that were taken. 11
And at this point Joe said, "Okay, okay, I
was a part of it. I was a part of the burglary."
lppellant has already pointed out (supra, page 14), that
{ersion of the statements alledgedly made by Appellant
~ot

square with Holley 1 s testimony on cross examination

, 44) wherein he was not able to state that Appellant
lid, "I was a part of the burglary."

Apart from the

lliat this does not affect the prejudicial nature of the
ar testimony given by Holley, which prejudice cannot be
~d,

the main problem with Holley 1 s testimony lies in

iltiple defects in the "Miranda" warning Appellant was

~irst, Appellant was not advised, let alone clearly ad-

' that he had a right to have an attorney present with
!!!!ng questioning.

Secondly, Appellant was not advised

lf he could not afford to employ an attorney, he still
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right to have an appointed attorney present during any
ioning.

Rather, the statement made by Holley was in

nisleading, i.e., "The court would see that (an attor1as provided for his defense." (emphasis added).
1s

v.

u.s.,

See

389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.1968) wherein the

indicated that the statement "if and when you go to
1

made after statement of a present right to counsel is

r

to confuse an unsophisticated lay mind.

loreover, the record affirmatively establishes that Aplt indicated that he didn 1 t want to answer any more
.ons (this by Holley 1 s own testimony), but that notwith.ng Appellant 1 s attempt to avail himself of his consti~l

rights, and notwithstanding the fact that not even

:empt was subsequently made to insure that Appellant rel the procedural safeguards required by Miranda, supra,

re-condition to the admission of either a confession or

1

ions, Deputy Holley continued to question Appellant
hree hours later.
he instant case

'

therefore

'

does not present a question

State having a dheavy burden • • • to demonstrate that
fendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privillli_randa, supra at page 475, because the interrogation
iued Without the presence of an attorney and statements
lade."

Nor does this case present a question of a valid

inot being presumed simply from Appellant's silence af~~ate warnings were given nor simply from the fact that

ents were made, Miranda, supra, at page 475.

1

Not only

e deputy's attempt to provide the requisite warnings a-

e, but the record establishes that Appellant specificalicated that he wished to remain silent.
ppellant therefore submits that the trial court erred
owing the testimony of Deputy Holley to be placed before

ry, There can be no doubt that the record does not demte the procedural safeguards delineated by Miranda,
On the contrary, the record demonstrates a defectivei

the requisite warnings, a defectiveness or total lack
requisite procedural safeguards, an affirmative effort

!llant to avail himself of his privilege to remain sifurther questioning, and, therefore, a clear-cut violac the Fifth Amendment.

' Hearsay Testimony.
lpellant further contends that the trial court commit~judicial

error when it allowed the following testimony

1ty Holley in response to the question (at T. 40):

Q,

Can you tell us what this conversation was
and who said what first, and the answer, and
so on, if you could, please?

A, (A)nd Danny Carter said, "Joe, you just as
Well tell him the truth, because he knows about
it. He has been able to get some of the items
that were taken."

Again, the prejudicial nature of this testimony is not
1to doubt.

And the defect is evident.

It is pure hear-

and a violation of the right to cross examine.
ID

See

v, U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. ed 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620

0wherein

the Court held that admission as hearsay of a

1ssion of a co-defendant under an instruction that it was
itent only as to defendant 1 s confession was prejudicial
tiolative of the right to cross examine.

In the case at

wt even such an instruction was given.

See also Good-

~' 418 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1969).

C, Comment on Appellant's Silence.
Prejudicial error was also committed when the prosecutor,
lurely knew what the answer would be, elicited from Deputy

ly the fact that after having been given half a "Miranda"
~gAppellant had refused to answer any more questions.

The fact that a person attempts to exercise a constitu11 right is certainly not probative of guilt.

Moreover,

Int on a defendant 1 s attempt to exercise this constitu-

11 right is closely akin to the prosecution conunenting on
fendant 1 s failure to take the stand and testify in his
behalf.

U.S. v. Arnold, supra, page 20; see also,

~ California, supra, page 20.
D, Waiver.

The State may perhaps contend that even if there was no
-30-

~during
I

custodial interrogation by Appellant of his

1~cndment

privilege, there was a subsequent waiver at

of any constitutional infirmities because no objection
tde by trial counsel to the testimony.

In this regard,

it should be initially observed that the main point

~'

lver is that the defendant thought that foregoing the
involved would help him.

An Abortive State Proceeding, 74 Har. L. Rev. 1266

~of

How then can Appellant be said to have

$3-36 (1961).
~the
~when

objection to Holley's testimony by counsel's inthat was the only evidence upon which his convic-

could conceivably be basedZ
~2d

Reitz, Federal Habeus Corpus:

In Ledbetter v. Warden,

490 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971

~' the court indicated that counsel alone could not

fan objection to a confession which was the sole eviI, See also~ Grano, The Right To Counsel: Collateral

fJffecting Due Process, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1175 at 1208-

tloreover, the edict of Chief Justice Warren, Miranda v.
~' ~upra, at page 444 is clear:

Briefly stated our holding is that the prose2!tion may not use statements • • • stemmi~g
from custodial interrogation • • • unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self incrimination
(emphasis added).
The tenor of that language is clear and positive - - the

''fltj pn

m

~u

n

I"\

f-

11

c A>_

1 h;a11ma;iiUt:i.is~ti.lihwgwtiilliij~t-mili0Wi?ii?lllli6illl_ _ __
_l.Al.tol.IOl.lie~lL.Jl~a1.1:n:iJt;...is1.1.·.i.l

it says; it does not make objection a precondition to
',

~missibility

Amendment.

of statements taken in violation of the
The square holding of Miranda, supra, as

ed to this case, is that the State was not entitled to
e or use any evidence of the statements, inculpatory or
Mise, allegedly made by Appellant.
l~ther,

~te

the case at bar is squarely within the holding

v. Scott, 22 Utah 2d 27, 447 P.2d 908 (1968) where-

tls Court stated (at page 28):
There may be exceptional circumstances when
errors not excepted to are so clearly erroneous
and prejudicial to the fundamental rights of a
defendant that an appellate court will on its
own accord take notice thereof. State v. Cobo,
90 Utah 8"9.
Appellant submits that the foregoing errors in connection
!the testimony of Deputy Holley, admittedly not objected
'~pellant 1 s

trial counsel,were so clearly (1) erroneous,

lnd prejudicial, (3) to the fundamental rights of Appel-

tthat this Court should on its own accord take notice
eof and remedy the errors by affording Appellant a new
11.

There certainly can be no doubt that the failure of Ap~nt1 s trial counsel to object to the testimony of Deputy

~y on the grounds set forth above is not a bar to review

lhe errors involved by this Court.

But in • • • cases involving the life and

liberty of the citizen, we think that when palpable error is made to appear on the face of
the record and to the manifest prejudice of the
accused, the Court has the power to notice such
error and to correct the same ••••
fhe foregoing principle from State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89,

69P,2d 95 (1936) clearly indicates that the doctrine of
rby non-objection should not be applicable to this case.

bd the doctrine of harmless error certainly is equally

µcable in the instant case.

It is impossible to ration-

that absent the testimony of Deputy Holley reasonable
1

acting fairly upon the evidence presented by the State

)~ve concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Appell~llll11itted

the crime.

This Court would have to conclude

there is no possibility that the testimony of Holley
1~ve

had some effect on the result in order to hold the

is harmless.

Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 120, 449

241 (1969).

See also, Griffin v. California, supra page

h~ein the Court held that before a federal·constitution-

tor can be held harmless the court must be able to de.a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

l!oreover, in Milligan v. State, 8 Cr.L.Rptr. 2246 (Md. Ct.
App, November 1970) the court indicated that any state-

obtained in violation of the procedural standards enunId in Miranda, supra, is per se to be excluded and the
lis not to be afforded an opportunity to show that its
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~sion was harmless error.

To the same effect is People v.

ti9.' 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 363, 373 (1965):
The improper introduction of the confession
which has been obtained in violation of the constitutional right to counsel transgresses the
protection of due process no less than the illegal introduction of a confession which has been
coerced. In either case Courts cannot inquire
into the prejudicial nature of the introduction
of an illegally obtained confession • • • •
!POINT VI. APPELLANT WAS NOT AFFORDED EFFECTIVE
,ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
i

~The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United

~and Article

One, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah

I

criminal defendants the right to counsel.

~tees

Since

I

~v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 77 L.Ed. 158, 53 S.Ct. 55

~'the

constitutional mandate that a defendant is entitl-

I assistance of counsel has been held to require effective
'

~ance,

And since Gideon v. Wainwright, 3 72 U. s. 335, 9

i

fd 799, 83 s.ct. 792 (1963), there can be no question
I

the right of a criminal defendant to the effective assis ..
of counsel is fundamental in nature and essential to a

~rial, so that a violation of this right is a violation

•Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

No

lCtion can be attempted between attacks on state convicUnder the Fourteenth Amendment and those on federal con-34-

sunder the Sixth Amendment as is evidenced by Moore v.

J2 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd. Cir. 1970):
(T)he increased recognition of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel requires that the standard which prevails in federal cases under the Sixth Amendment should be
applied equally to state convictions to which
the same guarantee is made applicable by the
Fourteenth Amendment under Gideon v Wainwright.
0

e problem, then, lies in determining when a defendant
been afforded effective assistance of

couns~l,

and

esolution of the problem is not without difficulty,
nt submits that if a defendant establishes that he has
n afforded effective assistance of counsel his conviction
a proceeding lacking due process of law and is void.
1pellant submits and contends that he was not afforded efassistance of counsel, based upon the following facts:
,al counsel failed to object to admission of certain tes-

of Deputy Mack Holley which was clearly inadmissible
.t was apparent from the preceeding testimony of Holley
~om

the record) that any statements made by Appellant and

I by Holley were obtained by clear violations of AppelFifth Amendment rights by reason of a defective and mis! 11 Miranda" warning; (2) trial counsel failed to object to
V

inadmissible hearsay testimony of Holley regarding state-

~de

by Danny Carter, and then failed to request an appro-

instruction on the necessity of evidence to corroborate

rsay testimony concerning statements made by an accompl) trial counsel failed to object when the State elicit-

Holley Appellant's attempt to exercise his Fifth Amendght; (4) trial counsel erred in stipulating to certain
~,

failed to object to the court's direction to the

regard the stipulations as true, and then failed to reppropriate instruction regarding the stipulations or the
r of the judge; (6) trial couns.el failed to object to
t

that closing arguments were not being recorded or failed

st that they be recorded; and, (7) trial counsel failed to
to the court 1 s instruction (No. 11) on principals, which
tion was inappropriate, and prejudicial to Appellant.
~,

supra, did not purport to deal with the standard of

veness; its rational was that in an adversary proceeding a
nt cannot be expected to mount evan an adequate defense
the special skill and training of a lawyer.

Effectiveness

erefore be measured by performance of the functions for
he lawyer is fitted; Note, 78 Har. L. Rev. 1434; by experif not by training.

This must include not only to explain

ricacies of procedure and to serve as a strategist and
an during the trial, but to zealously apply an adequate
.ge of the principles of law to insure that the State does
:airly obtain a conviction.
e crucial determination for this Court, then, is whether
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were tactical or whether they resulted from a default

~

~nctions which the adversary system makes so critical.

:en this determination can be made without recourse to a
when, as with the case at bar, conduct during a trial is
inconsistant with any presumption of effective and con)US

representation.

Note, id. at 1448-49. ·Trial counsel• s

to object to the testimony of Deputy Holley is clearly
stent with any presumption of effective and conscientious
ntation because that was the only evidence upon which the
uld conceivably have found Appellant guilty and it was
inadmissible.
State v. Montoya, 22 Utah 2d 237, 451 P.2d 586 (1969),
out at
urt pointed XXl'llBHX 238 that counsel frequently fail to obirrunaterial matters and hearsay statements, for vatious
, including a belief that objection might cause the jury
eve that counsel does not want the whole truth to be pre-

The writer concedes as much, if the statements are immaBut in the instant case the statements are so prejudicial
:arly inadmissible that there is no justifiable reason for
: to object.

It is beyond belief that trial counsel failed

1ct out of fear that objection might cause the jury to be-

:hat he did not want the whole truth to be presented because
the tainted testimony a conviction could not have been ob-

' That is what the question reduces to: the State could not

1tained

a conviction absent trial counsel 1 s errors. Appel-

1erefore invites the State to now demonstrate to this Court
1e tactical reason for failing to object, and submits that
1stion of tactics or strategy cannot even arise.
1art from the fact that the testimony was inadmissible, the
.on need not have even gotten close to the jury.

Holley

m called at the preliminary hearing (R. 3), so trial coun1

aware of his testimony and should have moved to suppress

the trial even commenced.
1

But most important, without

s testimony i t would have made no difference what the jury

: because, as is demonstrated in Point I., supra, 9-11,
Int would have been entitled to a directed verdict.
it even if trial counsel 1 s default of his essential func-

lid not appear so clearly from the record, this Court, in
ling its primary duty of determining whether Appellant rea fair trial, may turn to facts outside the record to asn the reason for trial counsel's omissions.

In this regard

eAffidavit of appellate counsel, Appendix, which estabthat trial counsel's omissions not only did not stem from
I

or strategy, but that they per se constitute ineffective

entation.

See also Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsi-

of the American Bar Association, which provides: "A lawyer
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
l consideration 1 of Canon 7 states:
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The duty of a lawyer ••• is to represent his client
zealously. ••• The professional responsibility of a
lowyer derives from his membership in a profession
which has the duty of assisting memqers of the public
to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each
member of our society is entitled to have his conduct
judged • • • in accordance with the law ••••
Pineda v. Bailey, 340 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1965), the Court
at 164:
(A) review of the record in ~his case convinces us
that it cannot be said that Appellant's counsel met
that standard (of counsel reasonably likely to render
and rendering reasonably effective assistance). The
record fails to show that (counsel) brought to th;-defense of Appellant the zeal which the law requires
for his defense. His conduct is more consistant with
an attempt to go through the formalities of a trial
than it is with an interested counsel's best efforts
to develop and present his client's case (emphasis added).
Cofield v. U.S., 263 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1959) the
aid:

The right to the assistance of counsel means effective
assistance. Edwards v. U.S., 78 u.s. App. D.C. 226, 139
F,2d 365. This contemplates the conscientious service of
competent counsel, and a mere perfunctory appearance for
~ndant is not enough.
U.S. v. Wight, 2 Cir., 176 F.2d
376, 378. Representation in the role of an advocate
Uther than of an amicus curiae is required. Ellis v. U.S.
356 u.s. 674. The basic inquiry remains --- was the
representation adequate? (citationa omitted-emphasis added),
This can be determined only by comparing what an attorney
actually did in behalf of his indigent client with what he
probably could have done had the circumstances permitted.
the case at bar the circumstances certainly permitted

ounsel to do much more than de did, and Appellant submits
ult of his trial would have been reversed had he done so.

~use there was absolutely no reason for the failure,
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the

nd simple fact is that trial counsel's failure to object
prejudicial to Appellant as the tainted testimony itself.
dealing with questions of ineffectiveness this Court has
d in substance the test whether counsel has conscientiousormed the representation and functions for which he is
and which are so critical in the adversary system.

In

ing the applicable standard in Alires v. Turner, supra
r, the Court posed, at 121, as a necessary question whether
~s

a basis for believing that better representation by

.would have been of some advantage, stating that
this is so because it is the policy of our law,
established both by statute and decision, that we
do not reverse for mere error or irregularity, but
only where it is substantial and prejudicial. That
is, not unless the error is of sufficient importance that it might have had some effect on the
result (citations omitted; emkphasis added).
~re

c an be no question that better representation by coun-

I

possible and would have been not only of some, but of tre-

I

advantage to Appellant; nor can there be any question that

:ounsel 1 s failure to have excluded the testimony of Deputy
Was of sufficient importance that it might have had some
on the result.
similar standard, if not the same, was employed by this
~gate v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 238, 419 P.2d 770:

The reversal of a conviction is not warranted
unless there is a deficiency which has some material bearing upon the fairness of the proceeding
or had some possible effect upon its outcome.
(emphasis ad~a-e~a....) - . - - - - -

~e writer does not wish to disagree with the statement of
~rt

in Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah2d 19, 22, 465 P.2d

970) that:
it is time to let imprisoned felons know that
even under the rules laid down by the Federal Courts
freedom from confessed guilt, voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently admitted, will not be given by the
courts because of alleged incompetence of counsel
unless there has been such a flagrant abuse of legal
procedure as to amount to bad faith on the part of
the lawyer. The Oklahoma case of Yarbrough v. State,
457 P.2d 826 (Okla. Cr. 1969), holds that merely
alleging and asserting inadequate representation on
the part of counsel is of no avail to a felon. The
burden is upon one to show that at the time of trial
counsel failed in some manner to represent him which
failure resulted in prejudice to his defense (citation omitted; emphasis added).
1wever, Jaramillo involved a guilty plea and the Court was
1 say

~er 1 s

there was no evidence of any dereliction of duty on
part in regard to the representation given.

And in

1tant case Appellant has not voluntarily admitted guilt;
lh he did not take the stand, he does assert his innocence.
lawareness that a substantial number of imprisoned felons
!hey are innocent, the writer submits that the instant

far from convinces that Appellant is in fact guilty.
l~ntoya, supra page 37, the ineffectiveness alleged was

counsel failed to object to testimony of an officer

It
~e
1

victim told him three individuals entered his tavern

he was ready to close).

The Court stated that there

dispute about that matter anyway (it must therefore have
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stablished by other evidence) and noted that the defense
ibi and had been adequately presented.

In the instant

however, Appellant did not take the stand, and his defense
be characterized as the weakness of the State 1 s case and
ability to prove his guilt.

This is a matter about which

is dispute and the defense was not adequately handled in
ighly prejudicial evidence which was clearly inadmissible
lowed to get before the jury and thus greatly bolster, if
ke, the State 1 s case.

Moreover, as is discussed in Point

upra page 22, the closing arguments were not recorded, so
is no way to ascertain what trial counsel 1 s theory of det1as nor how it was presented to the jury.
~ple

v. Ibarra, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963),

lkingly similar to the case at bar.

On appeal from a con-

n for unlawful possession of heroin, the defendant contendt

the heroin introduced into evidence was obtained by an

Bl search and seizure and that he had been denied his
to effective representation in that the public defender
lled to object to admission of the heroin.

The record es-

~ed that counsel failed to object due to a mistaken belief
le

claim of illegal seizure was inconsistent with his main
that the defendant had never possessed the heroin.

lrd to the defendant, s contention that failure of counsel
tct demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the law that estab-
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denial of his constitutional right to effective aid of
L, Justice Traynor observed that to justify relief on this

an extreme case must be disclosed and it must appear that
L1 s lack of diligence or competence reduced the trial to a
or sham."

Justice Traynor continued, at 386 P. 2d 490-91:

In the present case the record demonstrates that
••• counsel did not know of the rule that the defendant could challenge the validity of the search and
seizure even though he denied the heroin was taken
from him and asserted no proprietory interest in the
premises that were entered. This rule should be comcomplace to any attorney engaged in criminal trials.
Counsel 1 s failure to research the applicable law
precluded the exercise of judgment on his part and
deprived defendant of an adjudication of what was
clearly the stronger of the two defenses available
to him. There is no merit in the contention that
counsel 1 s failure to object(was tactical). There
would have been no inconsistency in asserting that
there was no consent to the entry and no probable
cause to arrest and search and also that no heroin
was found in defendant 1 s possessione ••• Counsel 1 s
failure to object precluded resolution of the crucial issues supporting defendant 1 s primary defense.
It thereby reduced his trial to a farce and a
sham (citations omitted; emphasis added).
he significance of Ibarra lies in the court 1 s indication
ounsel 1 s misunderstanding of, and failure to assert, a
f law which should be commonplace to any attorney engaged

1

minal trials deprived the defendant of an adjudication of
itly strong defense; that this failure could not have been

ICtical reasons because there would have been no reason
1

object; and that this circumstance amounted to an extreme

Ind reduction of the trial to a "farce or sham."

Appellant

6

that failure of his trial counsel to object to admission
testimony of Holley concerning "admissions" allegedly

yAppellant must have derived from a misunderstanding of a

f law which should be commonplace to any attorney engaged
minal practice, or at the very least, from an unfamiliarity
he rule which precluded him from recognizing the defectivef the "Miranda" warning Appellant was given, and therefore

ecognizing the basis for objection; that this failure canexplained by reason of strategy or tactics; and that if
st be "farce and sham", his trial was thus reduced to such
e that was the only evidence upon which his conviction
conceivably have been based.
lee also, People v. McDowell, 73 Cal. Rptr.

1, 447 P.2d 97

, also involving misunderstanding by defense counsel of a
rule of law.

After recognizing that Ibarra was the law of

1rnia, the court concluded that the record demonstrated that
tlmisunderstood the basic rule that would have allowed eviof a defense of diminished capacity to be introduced in
tilt phase of the trial in order to negat_e the existence of
:ic intent.

The court noted that the rule should be corn-

ice to any attorney engaged in criminal trials and stated
)6):

11

(C)ounsel' s misunderstanding of this basic rule • • •

led defendant of a meaningful exercise of professional

Int, and hence effective representation.
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It resulted in

-ing a crucial defense from the case and thereby reduced
ial to a farce and a sham." (citing Ibarra, supra).
ppellant concedes that there is a line of cases following

i• Brady, 316 U.S. 45, which state the test to be whether
ial is reduced to a "sham, farce or mockery."

Apart from

1ct that the case at bar meets that test, it is significant
he cases actually employing that test were decided prior
~on

v. Wainwright, supra, which ·overruled Betts v. Brady,

!e based on the notion that the right to counsel meant com:at appointment; Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667; and not
~rily

competent during trial, which Gideon clearly requires.

after Gideon referring to "sham, farce or mockery" applied
language to competency during trial, and merely used the
'ge for convenience and authority.
~ses

The writer submits that

were really using a different test; see Bruce v. U.S.,

,2d 113, 116 (D.C.Cir.1967) wherein the court stated:

In earlier cases it was said that a claim based
upon counsel 1 s incompetence cannot prevail unless
the trial has been rendered a mockery and a farce.
!l_iese words are not to be taken literally, but
rather as a vivid description of the principle that
the accused has a heavy burden of showing requisite
unfairness •••• (I)t appears that an accused may obtain relief ••• if he shows both that there has been
gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in
effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense (citations omitted; emphasis added).
This Court has employed the rational of Bruce; cases cited
~

pages 40-42, as have a number of other jurisdictions.

~onwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599,

2d 349 (1967) reversed and remanded a burglary conviction.

urt, while rejecting two tactical errors asserted as demtive of ineffectiveness, reasoned thusly in finding a
(fuilure to object to the introduction of an allegedly
,d confession) the basis of a finding of ineffectiveness:

(S)ince the store owner did not testify that any
of the revolvers found in (defendant 1s)possession
were stolen, the entire ••• case rested upon (defendant1s) confession. Counsel's failure to object
to admission of this confession can be most easily
explained by insufficient preparation. The legal
aid file did not reveal the circumstances which
Appellant advanced at trial indicating that his
confession may have been the product of unconstitutional police action. It was not until Appellant
volunteeed·, without any assistance from trial counsel, the facts which would have supported a coersion claim that this possible issue entered the
trial. Counsel 1 s failure to object during the reading of excerpts of the statement was thus most
probably a product of his lack of knowledge of a
possible coersion claim.
We can find no r~asonable legal basis to support
counsel's failure to object. Without this confession
the prosecution 1 s case would have had no evidentiary
basis •••• We are therefore constrained to conclude
that ••e Appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel ••••
lssent in Washington stated that there was no doubt as to
efendant 1 s guilt and that he was relying solely upon recenteated legal technicalities and did not even allege his inno' Appellant submits that the right to counsel is a funda1 Principle of our law and not just a "legal technicality";

est illustration of that is the fact that there is substandoubt as to defendant's guilt (even the "admissions" on

the State's case was based were ambiguous; see discussion
1

at pages 14-16) and Appellant does assert his innocence.

~State v. Robinson, 450 P.2d 180,182 (Sup.Ct.Wash.1969),

urt stated the test, as set forth in State v. Thomas, 71

1

!d 470, 429 P.2d 231 (1967), to be: "After considering the
!

record, can it be said that the accused was afforded an

:ive representation and a fair and impartial trial?"

:o the same effect is 0 1 Conner v. Warden, 6 Md.App. 590,
,2d 434' 438:

We point out that the test for determining the
competency of trial counsel is no longer whether
the representation was so deficient as to make a
farce out of the proceedings, but whether, under
all the circumstances of the particular case,
counsel was so incompetent that the accused has
not been afforded genuine and effective legal
representation (citations omitted).
Uincoe v. State, 185 N.E. 2d 729, 730-31, (Sup.Ct.Ind.
did not even mention farce, sham, or mockery, but the
did state:
We have also repeatedly held that there can be
no valid trial of a criminal case unless the defendant is adequately defended by competent counsel,
and that a judgment rendered under such circumstances is void (citations omitted;emphasis added).
ln!§_rried v.
~rger,

u.s.,

389 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C.Cir. 1967), then

omitting any reference to the sham or mockery test,

the following statement:

The question ••e is whether his representation
l;las so ineffective that Appellant was denied a
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fair trial.
[n

the instant case how can it be said that Appellant re-

l a fair trial when the only evidence on which his conin

could conceivably be based was clearly inadmissible?

counsel certainly did not meet the test of Brooks v. Texas,

,N 619, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1967):
The test was well stated in MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F. 2d 592, 599 ( 1960): "We interpret the right
to counsel as the right to effective counsel. We
interpret counsel to mean not errorless counsel,
and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight,
but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance (emphasis added).
lgain, there can be no question of prejudice.

"The right •••

sistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
Ito indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejuIrising from its denial."

Cross v. U.S., 392 F.2d 360, 367

Cir, 1968), citing Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 76.
~nd there is no lack of precedent from the Tenth Circuit.

L._v. Davis, 444 F.2d 72 (10th Cir.1971), a case arising
1the District of Utah, a colloquy occurred between the
1

judge and defendant 1 s attorney prior to the defendant s
~i~ called for trial in which the court had told counsel

times that counsel needed a lawyer for himself, questioned
ll's competence and had stated that the court would have

el investigated by the disciplinary committee of the bar
lation,

In deciding whether this exchange had functioned
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1 effect,

deprive the defendant of effective assistance of

•1, the court adopted the following language: "When counsel
~nerved

that he cannot devote his best talents to the de-

of his client, then this is ground for reversal, no matter
Founse 1 1 s experience • • • may be. 11

(

ci ta ti on ommi t ted).

I

rhe case of Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F. 2d 30 (9th Cir .1962)
so squarely in point.

The allegation of ineffective assis-

I there involved was failure, through lack of investigation
~eparation,
~which
~

to discover and present substantial defenses,

was inadmissibility of a confession.

The appellant

that he had told an arresting officer that he wished to

~tan

attorney; the Affidavit of appellate counsel recited

•usation with trial counsel to the effect that trial counllistakenly supposed that communications between he and a
~iatrist would not be privileged; and trial counsel made no

to exclude a confession which the court indicated was ex-

~t

able if Appellant's allegations were true.
It

At page 37 the

stated:

.,,

(T)he constitutional requirement of representation at trial is one of substance, not of form. It
could not be satisfied by a pro forma or token appearance ••••
Due process ••• (requires) counsel reasonably
.!:_!kely to render and rendering reasonably effective
~sistance. MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 596
(5th Cir. 1960), modified 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1961).
Determining whether the demands of due process were
met in such a case as this requires a decision as to
•
II
Whether "upon the whole course of the procee d i.ngs,
and in all the attending circumstances, there was a

denial of fundamental fairness ••••
The defense actually tendered was so insubstantial in relation to those not offered as to cast
doubt upon the hypothesis that trial counsel made
a deliberate informed choice. (at n.46: It is difficult to credit the suggestion, for example, that
... counsel deliberately chose to stipulate to the
admission of confessions which were the sole evi~nce of ••• guilt and which were at least arguably
excludable ••• on the theory that it would be better
strategy to invoke the sympathy of the jury by a
display of candor, especially since under California procedure the objection to the confessions could
have been submitted initially to the court out of
the presence of the jury.) In any event, it would
not seem proper to dispose of so substantial a showing "by a resort to speculation and surmise" as to
possible explanations for counsel 1 s inaction. (citations omitted; emphasis added).
in Brubaker, in the instant case the claimed ground of
tiveness

re~ates

to failure to have allegedly inculpatory

nts excluded, they were the sole evidence of guilt, and
ection could have been made out of the presence of the
But whereas in Brubaker the court regarded allegations as

~ing a strong showing and the confessions as arguably

h~, in the instant case the facts appear from the record
:

11

admissions" were clearly inadmissible.
CONCLUSION

1pellant submits that the foregoing errors and deficienlhis trial, each sufficient to justify reversal, combined

rive him of a fair trial and thus due process of law.
Durt should reverse.
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Respectfully submitted,

Richard M. Day
Attorney for Appellant
915 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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APPENDIX
AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
1te of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT
Gene Carter,

No. 12467

Defendant and Appellant.
1f Utah

)
)ss.
of Salt Lake)

.chard M. Day, being first duly sworn and on oath,
: and says:
1at he was appointed by the Supreme Court of the
f Utah to represent the above named Appellant on

1

of the above entitled action;
.at in connection with said representation Affiant

td Appellant's appointed trial counsel by telephone
~t

10, 1971, for the purpose of discussing Appellant 1 s

~~rally,

and ascertaining in particular why trial

.had failed to object to the testimony of Deputy
•Mack Holley concerning admissions alledgedly made
1llant ·
)

iat in response to Affiant 1 s query concerning the

for non-objection, trial counsel stated to Affiant
~e was "no particular reason, but mainly he was

sly guilty as hell;"
~t

thereafter Affiant requested by letter that trial

l provide Affiant with an Affidavit concerning his

s for failing to object to said testimony;
nat trial counsel, by letter' declined to do so, and

in said letter that notwithstanding his statement that
his opinion that Appellant was guilty, he could not
tly recall the reason, if any, why I made no objection

testimony" of Deputy Holley.

/sf Richard M. Day
ubscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of

er, 1971.
mission Expires:
/14/74

/sf Gayle Dean Hunt, Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

